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judgment against them on a certain promisory note 
secured by two second mortgages on real property. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to -the Court. From a verdict 
and judgment for the Cross~defendants and against 
the Cross-complainant, no cause of action/ the Cross-
complainant appeals. -
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Cross-complainant seeks a reversal of the judg-
ment/ and judgment for the Cross-complainant, or 
a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The original action was brought by the plaintiff, 
American Savings and Loan Association as first 
mortgagee to foreclose its mortgage on real proper-
ty located in Salt Lake City/ Utah. Joseph Jerry Jere-
my and wife had sold this residence property to de-
fendants Ruth C. McOmber and to her friend Clin-
ton H. Anderson. Mrs. McOmber and Mr. Anderson 
co-signed a note as part payment on this home and 
delivered the same to Mr. and Mrs Jeremy, Cross-
defendants. Anderson and McOmber also each 
signed second mortgages to secure the note, which 
was in the sum· of $4500.00/ and delivered the 
mortgages to the Jeremys. 
Dr. Harry Berman/ cross-complainant owned a 
home in Salt Lake City which had been listed for 
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sale for some time (TR. 44, 147). Dr. Berman request-
ed a good friend of his, Sterling Webber, who was a 
real estate broker to help sell the property. (TR. 146, 
147, 148). The Jeremys were looking for a home to pur-
chase having recently sold their own to Anderson 
and McOmber (TR. 122). Mr. Webber's saleslady met 
the Jeremys and arranged for Mrs. Jeremy to see the 
residence. She did so and later returned with her 
husband. They told the saleslady that if Dr. Ber-
man would accept the $4500.00 note and the two sec-
ond mortgages that they had received from Ander-
son and McOmber from the sale of their former 
home, they would buy the Berman home (TR. 7, 
123). The Bermans accepted the proposal and the 
Holt-Webber Agency handled the closing of the 
sale. Mr~ Webber prepared the necessary docu-
ments for the closing. Prior to the closing on Octo-
ber 10, 1959, Mr. Webber states that Dr. Berman 
qalled him by telephone and asked if the J eremys 
were willing to guarantee this note and the second 
mortgage. (TR. 155, 156). Mr. Webber states he tele-
phoned Mr. Jeremy the same day and asked him to 
guarantee the note, but was told by Mr. Jeremy that 
he would not do so. (Tr. 156). Mr. Jeremy refused 
to sign, endorse, or guarantee the note for $4500.00. 
Mr. Jeremy told Mr. Webber that he had too many 
other obligations including a proposed "side note" 
with Dr. Berman ~or $3000.00 as additional balance 
due and owing to Dr. Berman, and stated that if the 
sale of the home hinged on his guaranteeing the 
$4500.00 note, he would not be able to buy the resi-. 
dence (Tr. 198). Mr. Webber testified that he then 
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was quite certain that he notified Dr. Berman of Mr. 
Jeremy's decision shortly after his discussion with 
Mr. Jeremy, and told Dr. Berman that Mr. Webber 
would have to prepare an assignment of the note 
to him (Tr. 157, 158). Dr. Berman denied having ever 
discussed the matter of guaranteeing the Anderson-
McOmber note with anyone before or at the time 
of the sale (Tr. 34, 260). 
When the sale was closed on October 10, 1959, 
Mr. Webber prepared a written assignment as a 
separate "document wherein Mr. and Mrs. Jeremy 
assigned the Anderso;n-McOmber note, agreement 
and mortgage dated August 10, 1959, to Dr. Berman 
and his wife. Mr. Webber, a notary public, notar-
ized the Jeremys signatures on the assignment doc-
ument. This assignment, together with the' note, 
(which was not ·endorsed) and a second mortgage 
from Mr. Anderson and a second mortgage from 
Mrs. McOmer, and a two-page agreement prepared 
by Mr. Jeremy's attorneys, Romney and Nelson (Tr. 
209, 211, 213, 214), were all transferred to Dr. Ber-
man, who acknowledged receiving the same on 
October 10, 1959 ((Tr. 16, 17). Approximately 14 
months later, in late November, or early December, 
1960, Dr. Berman contacted the Je:remys and· ar-
ranged to come by the following night_ ;'to P,ave the 
Jeremys sign the note needed for his protection be-
cause someone in Idaho had a mortgage against 
his property" and Dr~ Berman had to makE? cert~n 
that everything was legal, he said (Tr~ 135, 136). The 
Jeremys had a pleasant visit with .D~~'_Befi!lan and 
his wife, and showed- certain alteratidns ,in the form~ 
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er Berman home, at which time Dr. Berman present-
ed the note to Mr. Jeremy for his endorsement (Tr. 
135). Mr. Jeremy was perplexed and telephoned a 
friend and lawyer, Merrill K. Davis, concerning the 
giving of an endorsement on the note and was told 
to sign it "without recourse." (Tr. 201). Mr. Jeremy 
added the words "without recourse" and he and his 
wife endorsed the note as requested. Dr. Berman 
and Mrs. Berman accepted the note without any 
comment and left (Tr. 14). At this time American 
Savings & Loan Co., the holder of the first mortgage 
on the former Jeremy home, which the Jeremys 
sold to Anderson and McOmber, was suing to fore-
close the first mortgage. Dr. Berman and the Jeremys 
were named as defendants, because of the second 
mortgages given, which the Jeremys had assigned 
to Dr. Berman. Nothing was said by the Bermans 
concerning the lawsuit during their visit with the 
Jeremys. 
Subsequently Dr. Berman, as a defendant and 
Cross-complainant, sued Mr. and Mrs. Jeremy as 
Cross-defendants and Respondents seeking judg-
ment on the $4500.00 note, which Mr. and Mrs. 
Jeremy had assigned to him, together with the sec-
ond mortgages. 
Dr. Berman and Mr. and Mrs. Jeremy all testi-
fied that at no time had Dr. Berman ever made de-
mand upon Mr. and Mrs. Jeremy for payment of the 
$4500.00 note, which monthly payments had become 
delinquent by Anderson and McOmber, nor had 
the Doctor ever notified them that the note was 
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in -default although it became so shortly alter Dr. 
Berman accepted it. The Doctor admitted that either 
he, or Mr. Webber, the real estate friend, made nu-
~erous demands upon Mr. Anderson for payments. 
It was still delinquent at the time Dr. Berman visited 
the Jeremys (Tr. 201). 
POINTS URGED FOR DISMISSING APPEAL AND 
AFFIRMING JUDGMENT OF LOWER COURT 
POINT I. APPELLANT (TRANSFEREE) WAS 
ENTITLED TO THE UNQUALIFIED ENDORSEMENT 
OF THE TRANSFEROR ONLY IF THERE WERE NO 
AGREEMENT TO THE CONTRARY; BOTH PARTIES 
USED A 'COMMON AGENT, (REAL ESTATE BROK-
ER) AND NO WRONGDOING WAS INDICATED ON 
HIS PART. 
The Parr vs. Pierce Bank & Trust Co., 100 Flor-
ida 941, 130 Southern 445, mentioned on page 7 of 
Appellant's Brief, from the excerpt quoted, seems 
to have merit. However, the fact situation shows the 
court held as it did in order to protect a widow (the 
assignee) from her bank (assignor) who had author-
ity to invest her money for her in "dependable se-
curities." The facts were: In January, 1926 the bank 
had received an $8000.00 note secured by -'.~ mort-
gage on real estate. It was a three year note with 
interest payable semi-annually. In August, 1927, the 
bank "assigned" the mortgage and note to the plain-
tiff, and "the money due" ... with interest from the 
first day of July, 1926." (P. 943). The Court says that 
"on its face at the time of this ~assignment'. the mak-
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ers of the note and mortgage were in default for 
non-payment of interest due January lst 1927 and 
July lst, 1927. The bank then proceeded ·to charge 
the widow's account for the full sum of $8,00;00 at 
a time when the makers of the note had defaulted 
in two interest payments. The Court stated the bank 
should, instead, have declared the full sum of the 
debt due and· foreclosed the mortgage because :of 
the default (P.944). The widow was obliged td fore~. 
close the mortgage and was left with a substantial 
deficiency. She now maintains the bank should have 
given :he.r its., unqualified endorsement on the note. 
As the Court .says (P~ 944).~'equity.looks upon that as 
done which should have been done." The Court re-
quired the bank t6. give its unqualified ~ndot$ement 
to the widow •.. The fact siluati6I1.here cle9-rly.distin-
guished ··it Jtont the one at issue. 
In the 'Parr case .the court . quotes, . from Bran-
nen's -NJ.L~, Page 170 and 25-9 concerning Section 
49 of the · N .I.L. (Title 44-1..;50 Utah ·.Code. Annotated 
1953) which seems to relentlessly command an un-
qualified endorsement regardless of any agreement 
for lesser endorsement, as follows: 
"It certainly . does not follow that Section 49 
required an unqualified endorsement in every case. 
Section 49 does not specify any one kind of endorse-· 
ment. In every c.ase the. transferee must go into' a· 
court of equity to compel an endorsement~ Obvious!~ 
he will. be given the kind o·f endorsement to which 
he is entitled. If the parties agreed that the traps.;. 
. feror was not to assume personal liability, an' en-• 
dorsement (without recourse) giv:e.~ the· tl'an$:f~tee: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
all that he is entitled to by common sense, by equity, 
or by Sections 49.', 
Appellant cites Fuchs vs. Leahy, 321 Mo. 47, 
8 S.W. 2nd 897, on Page 9 of his brief. Part of the 
quotation is omitted by Appellant but is set out fully 
below with the omitted portion added and itali-
cized. The Fuchs case, by the way, holds. squarely 
against the Appellant's position. The entire quota-
tion, which is significant, is: 
"Where two or more principals employ the same 
agent, whether as a means of dealing with one an-
other, or to protect their common interests~ one can-
not char.ge the other not actually at fault with the 
misconduct of the common agent. The latteT owes 
no more duty to one than to the other; each of the 
principals is under equal duty to supervise the agent 
and pro·tect his own interests, and there is no reason 
why the misconduct of the agent should be imputed 
to one principal rather than to the other." 
This case is intended to cite the law concern-
ing the dual agent's rights and duties but is prob-
ably not ·applicable in our case for the reason that 
the Fuch's case was one in fraud and . deceit. As 
stated, the court held that the plainttff in that case 
was not entitled to a judgment against defendant. In 
the Fuchs case the negotiations between the plain-
tiff and the defendant were made through a real 
estate agent. The court held any misrepresentations 
were made by the real estate agent and not by the 
defendant. The court stated that each of the princi-
pals h~d an .equal duty to. supervise the agent and 
protect· his 1 bwn: 'interest. (P. 56). ,This the plaintiff 
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failed to do and he cannot recover. Respondent 
Jeremys urge that the Appellant, Dr. Berman, £ailed 
to supervise his friend, the real estate agent, Mr. 
Webber, if he, Dr. Berman were not agreeable to 
the arrangements Mr. Webber accepted from the 
Jeremys. 
Neither of the cases cited by Appellant on Page 
10 of the brief are applicable, namely the Owens 
vs. Schneider case, 85 Pac. 2nd 198, and Herdon 
vs. Hanson, 189 440, cases from California. Both of 
those cases involved fraudulent misrepresentations 
by the common agent. In the Owens case the com-
mon agent induced the plaintiff to exchange land 
with the defendant and the plaintiff suHered a loss 
by the agent's misrepresentations and conceal-
ments. In the Herdan case, also involving a com-
mon agent, the defendant, one of the principals, 
benefitted and profited by the false and fraud-
ulent representations of the agent, and the defen-
dant principal was held liable in damages. How-
ever both of these were fraud actions and neither 
are in point with Dr. Berman's case against the Jere-
my's. Nowhere was it contended that Mr. Webber, 
the common agent, had· made false, nor fraudulent 
misrep:resentations,_ nor were the steps necessary to 
set ui:> fraud. indicated anywhere in the record. 
The courts are in conflict, however, concerning 
whether the seller can recover from the buyer, even 
when there are fraudulent representations by ·the 
real estate broker. 'rn the case of Ringer vs. Wilkin 
0919) an Idaho case, 183 Pac. 986, the court held 
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the f?ell~r. is not liable to the buyer for fraudulent 
representations of the broker even though the seller 
gave no instructions and did not know the fraudu-
lent representations were made. Neither principal, 
the court held, could be held for the tortious acts of 
the broker in the absence of collusion or participa-
tion by one of the principals in such tortious acts 
(P. 986, 988, 989). Two other cases, where fraud and 
deceit are not charged; hold that the plaintiff can-
not recover damages. One of these is the case of 
Brown vs. St. John Trust Company, a Kansas case, 
1905, 80 Pac. 37. The court held the plaintiff could 
not recover for damages caused in a contract with 
a defendant, where there was a common agent em-
ployed and paid for by both parties, when the com-
mon agent neglected his duties and caused the 
damage claimed. 
In the case of Mason vs. Bernett (\N ashington) 
1923, 218 Pac. 255; the buyer and seller of land had 
a common agent, wherein the seller paid a commis-
sion. The agent was consulted by the buyer on mat-
ters collateral to the sale of the land. The buyer 
thereafter claimed that she was advised that she 
~~~l<;i forfeit the payments made by her and termin-
ate the contract at any time. However, the court 
stated that she could read and write/ was a woman 
of . ~~me means, and with business experietice. If 
she failed to read the note and mortgage involved 
herein, it was her own fault. The court stated the 
real estate broker was her agent concerning the 
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legal effect of the collateral inqu1nes which she 
made, and the seller was not liable for any represen-
tations which the common agent made. 
In a 1906 Texas case, Blair vs. Baird, 94 S.W. 
116, the court likewise held that in a contract be-
tween a buyer and a seller of cattle, where both 
parties hired a joint agent to count the cattle, the 
seller was not liable for the misconduct of the joint 
agent, unless it was shown that the two conspired 
together to defraud the buyer of said cattle. 
Nowhere in the record in Dr. Berman's action 
against Mr. and Mrs. Jeremy, is it charged, implied, 
or made out that there was any conspiracy, any 
fraudulent misrepresentations nor the elements of 
deceit charged to the real estate broker, Mr. Web-
ber. Certainly none is charged to Mr. and Mrs. Jere-
my. The Jeremys were total strangers to Mr. Web-
ber prior to this sale; Dr. Berman and Mr. Webber, 
on the other hand, were friends and social acquaint-
ances. 
POINT II. RESPONDENT SHOULD NOT BE 
PENALIZED BECAUSE OF LACHES ON DR. BER-
MAN'S PART IN FAILING TO NOTIFY HIM OF THE 
DEFAULT OF THE NOTE OR OF THE NON-
PAYMENT THEREOF, NOR FOR DR. BERMAN'S 
FAILING TO ACQUAINT HIMSELF WITH THE 
TERMS OF THE SALE OF HIS HOME TO MR. AND 
MRS. JEREMY. 
Dr. Berman testified that, although he had ex-
amined the documents received from the Jeremys 
before the closing, he did not ask Mr. Webber, the 
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real estate broker about the contract (Tr. 31), that he 
did not understand the payment arrangement for 
the same to be in mutual fund certificates over a ten 
year period, that he didn't examine the documents 
involved, but "assumed that everything was all 
right," (Tr. 31, 32, 33). Dr. Berman never noticed that 
the $4500.00 note was not endorsed, nor that one of 
the mortgages had been recorded and the other one 
not recorded when he examined them and accepted 
them (Tr. 34, 35). The Doctor further stated that he 
relied on the real estate broker who was a friend, 
socially and also· a close acquaintance, although he 
admits he never told Mr. Webber what he wanted 
(Tr. 45, 46). Once, when Dr. Berman questioned the 
value of the note to Mr. I eremy he was told that it 
was "good as gold" and that apparently satisfied 
him and he inquired no further, although a week or 
more of negotiations were in effect before the I ere-
mys purchased the home from Dr. Berman {Tr. 9,11). 
The Pritchard vs. Strike case (66 Utah, 243 Pac. 
114), a 1926 Utah decision, was quoted by appellant 
on Page 6 of his brie~. The fact situation clearly dis-
tinguishes that case from the Berman-Jeremy con-
troversy in the following particulars: In the Pritch-
ard case the "endorsement" was on the n<;>te itself 
and used words of assignment to "assign, set over 
and deliver" the note and mortgage. This was a 
proper holding in view of the negotiable instru-
ments law, according to Briton on Bills & Notes. 
He says: "If a holder of a negotiable instrument 
writes on the back thereof:"! hereby assign the with-
in instrument to 'A' " or uses words of like import 
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and signs his name thereto and delivers the instru-
ment to 'A', such a transfer constitutes a negotiation 
of the instrument by endorsement and delivery/ and 
is not mere assignment of the holder's rights." In 
the endorsement of a negotiable instrument on its 
back, the additional words such as 1/without re-
course" or words of similar import are also required 
in order to make out a qualified endorsement. Brit-
ton on Bills and Notes, Page 230. Too/ in the Pritch-
ard case the ''endorser" was the president o~ the 
company that made the note. As such he had full 
knowledge of the presentment, demand and non-
payment of it. In the most positive language he was 
told that the plaintiff (transferee) would look to him 
for the payment of it. This distinguishes the case 
from the Berman vs. Jeremy case. 
_ _ Dr. Berman cites the Ackerman vs. Bramwell 
case, another Utah case, on Page 6 of his Brief, to 
support his claim that he is entitled to the Jeremy's 
unqualified endorsement. This case, however (80 
Ut. 53, 12 Pac. 2nd 623) is a "fraud" case; the plain-
tiff (transferee) won in the District Court. On appeal 
the case was reversed and remanded for a new trial. 
In this Ackerman case/ concerning the written as-
signment of a promissory note, the lo-wer court 
found that the transferror has unequivocally agreed 
to endorse the note for the plaintiff when she pur-
chased it, and also "guaranteed its payment" to the 
plaintiff holder, and it was actually the "intention of 
the parties that the company was to endo-rse the no-te 
but had not done so." (P. 60) (emphasis added). In 
the Ackerman case the assignment was represented 
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to the plaintiff by the defendant as being an "en~ 
dorsement and guaranty," but actually was not. In 
such a situation the holder was, of course, entitled 
to the endorsement of the transferor. 
One of the leading Utah cases on assignment 
matters is Johnson vs. Beiky (64 Ut. 228 Pac. 189). In 
tqat case the assignment was made by the defendant 
in good faith and for a valuable consideration and 
prior to the service of the Writ of Execution on. a 
bank who held the note as security. Johnson (the 
plaintiff and tranferee) relied upon N.I.L. (Sections 
44-l-31, 32 and 33, UCA 1953), asserting_that,· inte-r' 
alia, since the note was not actually delivered a,t the 
time of an assignment that he was entitled to a prior~ 
ity over the creditor. The ~upreme Court held 9th(3~~ 
wise, and stated: 
"Like an ordinary chose in action, a biu·-~r note· may 
be trans-ferred by assignment or by mere-- delivery 
with the usual incidence of such a transfer_, and this 
rule is not changed by the negotiable instruments 
law. It may be formal or informal; it may be by 
separate instrument, or in the absence of a statute 
to the contrary, by parol." Continuing, the court said, 
"No doubt a promissory no-te may be transferred 
without endorsement, the same as any other article 
of personal property, either under our statute, or 
independant of statute." 
The Court then added the followin_g significant 
statement, "Assignment" and "endorsement" as ap-
plied to ne-gotiable instruments are not syno-nomous 
terms. An endorsement is not me-rely a transfer o-f 
title, but a new and substantive contract by which 
the endorser becomes a party to the instrument and 
liable, on certain conditions, for its payment. An 
assignment means a transfer of the title. It neither 
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includes nor implies becoming: in a~y ··way a party 
to the payment, or responsible for the-insolvency or 
default of the maker. 
The Thatcher vs. Merriam, cas~ (121.lJtah 19 L 
240 Pac. 2d, 266) also recognized -that an. a§~!~nment 
o£ a promissory note together 'Witb··:ade~:d ·6£ trust 
and chattel mortgage given in:·security was upheld 
as an assignment in this state. 
In the case of Lawrence vs.: Cltfzen'~ State B~k, 
113 Kan. 724, 216 Pac. 262, also cited b}/Dr. Ber-
man on page 7 of his Brief, the f~ct s~t4atiof11s ·clearly 
distinguished from the Berman-I eremy contrbversy. 
In the Lawrence case no writte~.as~ignment was in-
volved, nor was there a clairr(<Sf ·one; the ISlaintiff 
was merely seeking the endot$km§nt''ort the note 
from the tranferor. The plainHH.hacl. acquJr~dfrotn 
the defendant, in due course,' i cg'ttairt notes '\,.;h.ich 
had. not been endorsed and pld'intiff sued·· for sl.Ich 
endorsement. The court held 'that· :the' plaintiff ··was 
entitled to the endorsment, "uh.t~ss'a'}n.1a]ifie4· en-
dorsement was agreed to by th~~·par-Ues,"'ot~is-fairly 
to be implied from the circums:tances. involv.~d in 
the transfer.'' . . -· 
7 - ij=-~- ,-. ' 
.. 
Appellant also stated, as b.eipg irr-qcoor<:i ,with 
the Lca:wrence case the QueensbcmO'·~Na:tional· ·Bank 
of the City of New York vs. Kelly, 48 ·Fed. 2d. 574. 
The Oueensboro case was a 1931 decision wherein 
the bank as payee sued Kelly as rnaker;·to~recover 
the principal and interest on a promissory note. The 
complaint was dismissed and the plai-:mtiff, appeared, 
and the case was -reversed and remanded fo:e .. a 
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new triaL Although some mention of "assignments'' 
and "endorsements" is made in the· court's opinion, 
there is nothing helpful in this case to benefit either 
Dr. B~rman or the Jeremys' in the issues involved 
here. In. the Oueensboro case the "assignment" was 
written on the marg1n of the note itself by the maker. 
Likew.ise cited, by the Appellant on page 7 of 
the Brief was Miller vs. Shelby County Investment 
Cqmpany, 30 S.W. 2d, 688. This was a 1930 Texas 
case and there was no "assignment paper" involved 
in that suit ... The promissory note was transferred 
from the defendo,IJ.t to the plaintiff. The issue was 
whether the trq.nsferee was entitled to an endorse-
ment because of defendant's "prior agreement" to 
give such endorsement. The court said, "Whether 
the tran,sferor of ... tbe note agreed, at the time of the 
transfer, to endo~e the note, was held to be a ques-
tion of fact; an agreement to transfer the note is 
prima ~acie an agreement to transfer it in the usual 
way by endorsement; if a transferor delivers an in-
strument without. an endorsement, upon good con-
sideration, It being agreed that he would endorse, 
and. he later refuses, equity may compel his en-
dorsement. Further, where the note is transferred 
for value, with the understanding that the transferor 
is not' to endorse, .or that the endorsement is only 
for the purpose of conveying title, the transferor 
cannot be held as an endorser. When a note, for 
valuable consideration is transferred without en-
dorsement there being no agreement regarding en-
dorsement, the transferee may compel an endorse-
ment in equity.'' {Emphasis added) The court held 
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that the transferor of the note had "promised to en-
dorse it," and therefore required his endorsement. 
Another Texas case, Prewitt vs. Uoyd, 240 S.W. 1039, 
on a similar fact situation to the Miller case, held ex-
actly opposite. There the jury found there was no 
promise by the defendant to endorse the note which 
had been transferred to the plaintiff. In neither of . 
the Texas cases was there a question of an instru-
ment of assignment involved, nor was there any 
claim of being a completed written assignment as 
existed between Dr. Berman and the Jeremys. 
Both Dr. Berman and the Jererhys testified· that 
Dr. Berman never made demand for- payment upon 
the Jeremys at any time, including up to the time of 
trial. Dr Berman waited approximately 14 months 
before he sought the endorsement of the Jeremys 
and never made timely demand upon them for pay-
ment of the note which had been defaulted by Mr. 
Anderson. 
In connection with Dr. Berman's failure iri this 
regard, or to even notify them that the note was in 
default, the Jeremys refer _to· the.·case. of Willard 
State Bank vs. Clarke; zoe· l?ac~_ 549, ·_a·: l<a;nsas case 
decided in 1922. Here the transferee received the 
note without the endorsement of the·transferor. The 
maker defaulted in its payments .. Two months arid 
11 days after ·the default, transferee of the note no~ 
tified the transferor concerning ·the . default . and 
claimed it is now- entitled ·to ·-trahsferor~~s endorse-
ment. The court held against thEi transferee::oh the 
grounds· thaf'the note cmust be presented:.:on the due 
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date to the_ maker/ .and if dishonored, the endorser 
rr{ust be_ prorpJ?~~y ;~~tified, either personally or by 
maiL Sections 44-1;.91 to 99 inclusive, Utah Code 
Annotated, 'f94~{ spe1l out this duty on the part of the 
transferee.·- . . · 
POINT IlL .. --~s-~IGNMENT OF NEGOTIABLE 
PAPER, BY A 'SEPARATE INSTRUMENT OF ASSIGN-
MENT, IS LEGAL;Ae'CORDING TO THE AUTHORI-
TIES, AND THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT LAW 
DOES NOT PRE:V~N~T S:UCI;I_ ~SSIGNMENTS. 
·-'· Ir:t1 AmeJ1cai1 Jyrisprude:qce, Section 75, page 
2S7i. it f:;tatesJhat. tl;l~ only form required for an 
assignment is t~atit··must comply with the fundamen· 
tal· requisites: applicable to the contracts as respects 
u1egality of' bbject, capacity of parties,. consideration 
and.·consent.n No-special form of words is necessary 
tc}: ~ff.ecf an ·As~igrl.fuent. The ·only-·thing required 
is language showing an intention of the owner of 
the· chose:Jn· action.·1o "transfer" it. This 'is sufficient 
to vest the prepettY,dn the assignee. Accord, 64 S.E. 
264,. (Georgia); 54·-,N.W. 867, Uowa); 154 Pac. 210 
(Kansas); :224 N.W~· 720 (Wisconsin.). 
·,: 
. In Appellant'.s 13rief, Page 5, he quotes Title 441-
1-50, Utah Gode::Annoted, 1953, concerning the trans-
feree's right to have;the endorsement of the trans-
feror. However;~:in ·:applying this statute in the case 
of :Thatche.t:j vs; ·;Merriam, 121 Ut. 191, 240 Pac. 2d, 
266, :the;Cotirt,held-·,that a bill or note may be trans-
fertedd:>y.·aSsignment or by mere delivery with the 
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usual incidence of such a transfer; and this rule 
is not changed by the Negotiable Instrument Law 
(Title 44, Utah Code Annotated 1953). Further, the 
assignment may be made by a separate instrument, 
and such an assignment was recognized and up-
held. 
On pages 8 and 9, the Appellant, in his Brief, ' 
argues that since there was "no language of limita-
tion in the assignment of the note at the time of its 
transfer to Appellant Berman" that appellant is now 
entitled to an unqualified endorsement. Assignments 
ordinarily carry no "language of limitation" such as 
the words "without recourse" and words of other im-
port. These qualifying endorsements are used in 
negotiable instruments and do not ordinarily ap-
pear on assignments. In this regard, both a qualified 
endorsement, such as would appear on a note, and 
an assignment instrument make certain warranties in 
that both represent that the document is genuine, 
that one has good title to it, that the prior parties had 
capacity to contract, and that one has no knowledge 
of any fact which would impair the validity o~ the 
instrument or render it valueless. Therefore, to add 
the further restrictive words, "without recourse," on 
an assignment instrument would seem to be both 
surplusage and redundant. In 8 Am. Jur. Section 
301, Pages 38 and 39, the rule of law is stated that 
a bill or note, whether negotiable or non-negotiable, 
may be· transferred by assignment. The negotiable 
instruments law does not prevent the transfer of a 
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negotiable instrument by assignment. In further sup-
port of this proposition are the following cases: Capi-
tol Hill State Bank vs. Rawlins National Bank (Wyo.), 
160 Pac. 1171; Carter vs. Butler (Mo.) 174 S.W. 399; 
Edgar vs. Haines (Ohio), 141 N.E. 837; and Moore 
vs. Miller, 6 Ore. 254. 
CONCLUSION 
· We respectfully submit that the Court was cor-
rect in giving judgment for the Jeremys and against 
Dr. Berman on the $4500.00 note and that the note 
had been legally transferred by the document of as-
signment. 
We believe the court did not err in its conclu-
sions and decision herein in light of all the testimony 
and evidence presented at the trial, including the 
memoranda of authorities submitted. The assignor-
assignee relationship claimed by the J eremys and 
disputed by Dr. Berman is a question of fact for the 
court. In this particular fact situation, most authori-
ties researched uphold this type of assignment as be-
ing a valid one. The Anderson note was transferred 
to Dr. Berman by ·the Jeremys by separate instru-
ment of assignment for the reasons heretofore stated; 
it was received by Dr. Berman, by his own testimony, 
as part payment and credit on the purchase of the 
house. He should not now be allowed to ignore that 
credit and require the J eremys to honor the Ander-
son note, by contending that the Jeremys were un-
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qualified endorsers of such note in view of the many 
other facts presented during the trial of the case. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MERRILL K. DAVIS 
Of DAVIS and BAYLES 
Attorneys for Cross-Defendants 
and Respondents 
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